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1. Introduction 
One of the basic aims of urban water supply systems is to make compatible higher levels 
of efficiency with a universal supply of an acceptable quality. Additionally, residential 
water suppliers are more often than not expected to pursue equity objectives, due to the 
essential character of water for several uses. Regarding these aspects, there is an 
unfinished debate about which kind of management (public, private, or mixed) is the best 
option. 
The main argument proposed to justify privatization processes has been its advantages in 
terms of efficiency. Public management is conditioned by several constrains, due for 
example to the multi-objective nature of their problem, or to being more subject to 
restrictive labour relationships or to those imposed by the political setting. Private 
management might be able to attract financial resources more easily, and in theory it is 
characterized by more flexibility and better experience. Therefore, private firms can in 
principle more easily finance improvements and maintenance of infrastructure and can 
provide a quicker response to different social demands in a rapidly changing environment 
(Beecher et al., 1995; Soler, 2003). 
 However, we can also find arguments against private management. Hall and Lobina 
(2004) pointed out that the incorporation of private firms into the water sector may lead 
to permanent conflicts between public and private interests. In fact, after some decades of 
privatization, several countries now show opposition to further privatizing of public 
services (Hall et al., 2005). First, water suppliers operate, generally, under conditions of 
local monopoly or at least in highly concentrated industries. Therefore, it is difficult to 
achieve high levels of effective competition, which means that the privatizing of water 
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public services should be regarded with caution (Rees, 1998). Second, privatization can 
be criticized on equity grounds. Sometimes, private suppliers increase prices without a 
corresponding enhancement in the quality of the service or capacity increases. Hall and 
Lobina (2004) and Lobina (2005) provide evidence of several privatization processes that 
have lead to price increases that were difficult to justify. 
In any event, it is not possible to generalize the findings of a few specific studies, so it 
would be necessary to consider empirically every particular case. In this respect, 
Carpentier et al. (2006) and García et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of urban 
water prices, including the type of management (public or private). In the former 
(Carpentier et al., 2006) public and private operators are compared, with prices found 
higher under private management mainly because the operating environment is harder. 
Local governments are keener to privatize water supply services if there are more 
technical difficulties in supplying water. García et al. (2005), who analyze the effects of 
technical factors, competition, and strategies of private firms on water price in France, 
show that the local strategy of the operator has a significant impact on the water price 
level. Private operators can set prices below or above costs depending on the specific 
situation. 
In Spain, local governments are expected to provide water supply and wastewater service. 
However, these services can be managed under alternative regimes. Municipalities can 
supply water services directly or through a public firm, or they can delegate the provision 
to a mixed or private firm. In consequence, there are currently a broad variety of 
management forms in the Spanish urban water sector. In 2002, (AEAS, 2004) 42% of the 
population was supplied by means of a public firm, 40% by private firms, 11% by mixed 
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firms, 6% directly by the local government and the remaining 1% by other kind of 
management (basically, municipality associations). Regarding the degree of 
concentration of operators in the Spanish water sector, we clearly find an oligopolistic 
structure. Although the delegation of water supply services is supposed to inject 
competition calling for bids and limiting the length of administrative concessions, there 
are two large corporate groups which dominate water sector. Additionally, although there 
are price regulations controlling the behavior of private firms, more often than not those 
controls are based more on formal criteria than on economic or technical ones. The 
regulatory boards are usually managed by experts in financial law and formal processes, 
rather than by experts in water supply economics or water supply engineering. In spite of 
this price regulation, private firms enjoy some degrees of freedom when setting prices, so 
they can change the tariff structure in order to get higher revenues. 
The main aim of this paper consists of testing if there exists any kind of relationship 
between the ownership of water supply services and urban water price levels in Spain. 
This issue is interesting from a socioeconomic and political point of view. When a local 
government declares its intention of privatizing water public services, it is usual that 
ecologist groups and/or left-wing parties show their opposition to the management 
change. They argue that the privatizing process leads to price increases that punish water 
users, especially those with lower income. 
In addition to that main issue, we would like to analyze other relationships between 
environmental factors and water price levels. For example, we will include variables of 
input and output water quality, in order to observe trade-offs between quality and price 
levels. The Spanish institutional context is similar to the French case, in the sense that it 
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is possible to find a coexistence of public and private management in the water supply 
sector. This fact makes it possible to investigate the relationships between ownership or 
management and water tariffs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of the 
link between privatization of water supply services and water prices in Spain, and as such 
constitutes a relevant contribution to the improve the state of the art in this field. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe the methodology used. We propose the 
use of a treatment effects framework in order to account for the likely endogeneity of the 
decision to delegate the water supply service. In Section 3 we describe the data set, the 
variables, and the main hypothesis to test in this paper. The results are analyzed in 
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Econometric Methods 
Comparing water price levels among municipalities where the service is wholly public 
and municipalities where it has been partly or wholly privatized is not straightforward. 
This is because municipalities are not likely to privatize the service in a random fashion. 
There are likely to be a series of characteristics of the operating environment that make it 
more attractive for a private firm to take over the service and/or for the municipality to 
try and delegate the service. In other words, some municipalities are probably more likely 
than others to be served by a private firm. Furthermore some of these characteristics of 
the municipalities that affect the likelihood of delegation also affect the level of price 
charged by the water supplier and cannot be observed by the researcher. 
The prices that would be charged in the municipalities with delegated management if they 
had instead remained under public management are not observable and the prices that 
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would be charged by a private firm in those municipalities still under public management 
are not observable either.  In order to model this endogeneity of the delegation decision, 
we analyze the influence of the delegation decision using a treatment effects model. 
Let pi be a binary variable that denotes the type of management in municipality i, such 
that pi =1 if the supply has been partly or wholly delegated to a private firm and pi =0 if 
the supply is still public. Define BILL0i as the average BILL size or, equivalently, the 
average price per cubic meter in municipality i when pi =0 and BILL1i as the equivalent 
measure in municipality i when pi =1. Ideally, we would want to measure the effect of 
delegation on price as 
 ∆i= BILL1i -BILL0i       (1) 
However, for a given municipality i, only BILL1i or BILL0i can be observed in our cross-
section, but not both1. That is:  
 BILLi = piBILL1i +(1-pi) BILL0i     (2) 
Therefore, it is impossible to measure directly the effect of the treatment (delegation of 
the service). 
Similar problems related to the analysis of treatment effects have been considered by, 
among others, Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), and Heckman and Robb 
(1985 and 1986). 
There are several ways to handle this type of problem and the reader is directed to 
Heckman (1992, 1997), Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) or 
Wooldridge (2002) for further details on treatment effects models. 
                                                 




In this paper we deal with non-experimental data on a cross-section,2 and we have reason 
to believe that the privatization effect can lead to hidden bias (rather than overt bias), so 
two estimators could be considered: the instrumental variables (IV) and the two-step 
Heckman selection estimators. Here we chose to follow a selection model approach 
(Heckman, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985 and 1986) based on a full information 
maximum-likelihood approach. This selection estimator uses two equations that are 
estimated simultaneously. In this case, the first equation is an explicit model of the 
privatization process which controls for the part of the privatization decision that is 
correlated with the error term of the second equation, which has the price level as the 
dependent variable.3 In our case, the outcome equation models the level of BILL as a 
function of a series of explanatory variables including p: 
BILLi = βX+αipi+µi       (3) 
Since the choice to delegate water supply services is likely to be non-random, we expect 
a non-zero correlation between the error term µi and  p i . If this correlation exists, it 
would not be valid to use a standard regression as Expression 3 alone. The selection 
model used estimates the part of the error µi that is correlated with p and then include it in 
Equation 3. By construction, what remains of the error term in Equation 3 is no longer 
correlated with the privatization decision. 
Therefore, we use a binary choice equation that models the likelihood that a given 
municipality delegates the water supply service (the likelihood that pi =1). We assume 
that this equation can be estimated using a Probit model based on the notion that there 
                                                 
2We have a pseudo-panel in the sense that we have several observations per municipality, 
but they all refer to the same time period. 
3The following presentation borrows heavily from Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
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exists a latent tendency in each municipality to end up with a delegated service: 
 I = γZ+υi         (4) 
where υi is an error term. This latent variable depends on a series of variables V, some of 
which, but not all, may be the same included in the set X in Expression 3 above. We 
observe, of course, only the value of the binary variable p, such that: 
 pi = 1 <=> Ii > 0 
 pi = 0 <=> Ii ≤ 0         
It is likely that the effect of the delegation on the price is heterogeneous among 
municipalities (hence the subindex in αi). Naturally, these differentiated effects should 
also influence the decision to delegate and are therefore likely to be correlated with p. 
Abstracting from other regressors, X, the BILL equation becomes: 
BILLi = β+αipi+µi         
where αi is the effect of delegation on BILL for municipality i. Define α* as the 
population mean impact, εi as the deviation of BILLi from the population mean and  α*T  
as the mean effect of delegation in municipalities with delegated services (the average 
treatment on the treated, usually labelled ATT in the literature). Thus  
αi = α*+ εi 
α*T = α* + E(εi|pi=1) 
where E(εi|pi=1) is the average deviation of the effect among delegated municipalities. 
The BILL regression equation may now be rewritten as: 
 
BILLi = β + α* pi +[µi + pi εi] = β + α* pi +[µi + pi(αi - α*)] 
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Additionally, another problem related to this heterogenous specification of 
treatment effects has to do with the form of the error term µi + pi(αi - α*). This term 
obviously differs across municipalities depending on whether they are privatized (pi=1) 
or not (pi=0). Identifying α* is more difficult when there is non-zero correlation with pi. 
Notice that if E(εi pi) ≠ 0, then  E(εi|pi) ≠ 0,
4 so: 
E(BILLi|pi) = β + pi [α* + E(εi|pi)]+E(µi|pi)    (5) 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator would identify: 
E(α’) = α* +E(εi|pi = 1)+E(µi|pi = 1) - E(µi|pi = 0)   (6) 
Therefore, even if µi is uncorrelated with pi, so that E(µi|pi = 1)  = E(µi|pi = 0)=0, 
an identification problem remains. From Expression 6 it can be seen that, without further 
assumptions or information, only the impact of privatisation on the privatized 
municipalities, α*T = α* + E(εi|pi=1), is identifiable. This is because, even if the error 
term, µ, is uncorrelated with the decision process, the municipality-specific component of 
the privatisation effect, ε, is most likely not to be. We expect municipalities to choose 
privatisation taking into consideration their own specific operating environment. In this 
case E(εi |pi = 1) ≠ 0 and identifying α* becomes more difficult.  
We assume that the effect of delegation on price in each municipality is not affected by 
the delegation of the service in any other municipality. This means that the treatment 
effect ∆i in Expression 1 for each municipality is independent of the treatment of other 
municipalities (Caliendo and Hujer, 2006). This is known as the stable unit treatment 
value assumption (see Holland, 1986) and guarantees that average treatment effects can 
                                                 




be estimated independently of the size and composition of the treatment population. In 
particular, it excludes peer-effects as well as cross-effects and general equilibrium effects 
(Sianesi, 2004). 
The selection model approach we use (Heckman, 1979, Heckman and Robb, 1985 and 
1986) accounts for selection on unobservables and relies on an exclusion restriction 
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000), which in this case requires the existence of at least one 
variable that determines delegation of the service but does not affect BILL. Additionally, 
we assume in the full information maximum likelihood estimation that the error terms in 
both equations (privatisation equation and price equation) are jointly normally 
distributed. 
If these assumptions hold then the estimates obtained5 are consistent, efficient, and 
asymptotically normal. Another approach to solve this problem that does not rely on the 
assumption of joint normality of the error would be to use a two-step Heckman selection 
method. This would not assume joint normality; just normality of the error in the 
privatisation equation. The two-step approach would be inefficient, however, if the errors 
are indeed jointly normal. As explained in Section results, we compared both approaches, 
finding no meaningful differences in the results obtained. However, we chose to finally 
use the FIML model because it showed a slight advantage in terms of efficiency and 
because it would allow us to use a cluster option to account for the pseudo-panel of the 
data set. 
All the econometric models used take into account that for each municipality each of the 
                                                 




eight values of the dependent variable (BILL) may well be correlated, because they 
belong to the same tariff structure. This is accomplished by using a random-effects panel 
data model that explicitly accounts for the pseudo-panel nature of the sample, and by 
correcting all standard errors by using the cluster option. 
 
3. Data, model specification and hypotheses 
The database used in this study includes information from 53 Spanish medium-big 
municipalities, which either have more than 100.000 inhabitants and/or are the capital of 
a province. Most of these urban water suppliers usually charge non-linear and non-
uniform prices. Therefore, for each of these cities, we calculated from the tariff structure 
a ``representative'' or ``theoretical'' average price corresponding to several levels of 
consumption, in order to reflect the level and structure of residential water prices in that 
municipality. In particular, for each city, we calculated the average price of 3 m3, 5 m3, 
10 m3, 15 m3, 20 m3, 25 m3, and 50 m3 per account and month. We include all those 
prices, alongside any fixed fee applied to the water BILL, in the estimations, because no 
information about the distribution of consumption was provided. The stacking of the 
eight observations on price as separate observations for each municipality lead to the 
availability of 424 observations (8 times 53). 
We wanted to find out which factors explain the differences across municipalities in the 
average prices corresponding to several levels of water consumption. All the variables we 
considered in the estimation are shown in Table 1, together with a description of each 
variable and its data source. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 about here] 
 
The dependent variable in the main price regression is the average price in the water 
BILL. This variable is denoted BILL. It is calculated as: 
              BILL = (Water bill corresponding to N m3/N)  
<=> BILLN = 1  for N = 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50  (7) 
and 
 BILL = Fixed Quota <=> FIXED =1 
Note that, for a given municipality, BILL would always take the same value, if all the 
tariffs were linear. This is the exception (it applies to less than 8% of observations) rather 
than the rule. With a majority of increasing block tariffs, we should expect BILL to rise 
with N. 
As explanatory variables, we first incorporated several socio-economic characteristics of 
the municipality, such as the size in terms of population and surface (POP,  AREA), the 
population density (DENS), the economic level ( ECON) and several features of the 
housing stock (SECDWEL, PM1, PM3,  PM7, PSEC1,  PSEC6, PSEC9, PSECTOT). The 
next set of factors includes two climate variables (TEMPER, HUMID) which can have an 
influence on price differences. An additional set of variables is related to water quality 
and other technical characteristics, such as an index of global water quality (QGLOBAL), 
the kind of treatment applied to water in order to make it drinkable (TREAT1,  TREAT2), 
or whether underground water sources are used (SUNDER). Moreover, several indicators 
related to the water tariff have been included, such as whether the observation 
corresponds to the fixed charge (FIXED) or, instead to one of three (BILL5, BILL20,  
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BILL50) among the seven different consumption levels.
6 Since normally the tariffs are 
based on an increasing-block structure, we expect the coefficients of BILL20 and BILL50 to 
be positive and the coefficient of BILL5 to be negative. Finally, with the double role of 
dependent variable in the regime equation and independent variable in the price one, a 
dummy variable was included to identify if urban water services are supplied under a 
private or mixed management7 regime is present (P). This variable takes the value of zero 
if the water supply is totally public and one otherwise. 
As we explain in Section Methods, in a first step (1) we estimate a Probit model to 
investigate the probability of there being a private or mixed water supplier. Next, we try 
to find factors which affect water prices level and structure (2). Thus, in Table 1 we point 
out which variables were considered in each estimation. Some of those variables were 
included only in the first step estimation (1), some only in the second one (2), and some 
in both equations (1, 2). 
In the regime equation, we included the four variables related to water quality, sources, 
and treatments (QGLOBAL, TREAT1, TREAT2 and SUNDER). In this sense, the 
expectation is not clear. On the one hand, private firms may look to take over water 
supply in those municipalities with good technical conditions. On the other hand, it is 
logical to think that municipal government will favour privatization when there are some 
                                                 
6Obviously, including all the eight dummies in the regression would lead to perfect 
multicollinearity, so we chose to include in the final regression an indicator of the fixed 
quota (FIXED), which is obviously rather different form any of the average prices, and 
three indicators of bill size: one associated with a low (BILL5), one with a medium-large 
(BILL20), and one with a very large (BILL50) bill size. 





economic8 or technical problems (Carpentier et al. 2006). At the same time, it is possible 
that private firms try to increase profits by reducing the quality of the service (Lobina and 
Hall, 2000; Hall and Lobina, 2005). 
Several socioeconomic factors (POP, AREA, ECON) were included in the regime 
equation. In particular, we wanted to test the influence of potential economies of scale, 
such as population and area (Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Estache and Rossi, 2002; 
Tupper and Ressende, 2004; Carpentier et al. 2006). Moreover, we are interested in 
observing if the economic level affects the probability of finding private management. 
We would expect that private firms seek revenue opportunities, so they would favour 
high-income municipalities. 
All the variables about features of the housing stock (SECDWEL, PM1, PM3, PM7,  
PSEC1,  PSEC6,  PSEC9,  PSECTOT ) were included in the regime estimation (Probit). 
We think than the absolute number of secondary dwellings could exhibit a positive 
impact on the probability of being privatized, since this may be linked to increased 
possibilities of collecting extra revenues. At the same time, the proportion of secondary 
dwellings within the total of housing units was included in order to test if private water 
suppliers are more likely to be located in tourist municipalities, where this variable would 
take higher values. Finally, we chose some representative variables associated with the 
percentage of housing units with different height used as main or secondary dwelling. It 
is well-known that buildings' height is an important factor behind water supply costs, but 
                                                 
8Miralles (2006) included an index of local government deficit in order to test that 
hypothesis. He did not find a clear and strong relationship. There was a low significance 
only during the 1992-1995 period, showing that, in that period, financial difficulties lead 
to increase the probability of privatization. 
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also in revenues. Obviously, if the building is very tall, it is more expensive to pump up 
water to the highest floors. Moreover, one-floor height dwellings are usually owned by 
customers who enjoy a higher consumption purchasing power, because of their bigger 
size and the higher probability of including a garden. 
The last variable considered is the ideological orientation of the ruling local government. 
Miralles (2006) found a higher probability of privatization under right-wing or moderate 
local governments. We also think that the probability of being privatized is lower in those 
Spanish municipalities ruled by left-wing governments, because those governments are 
less fond of privatizing public services, unless there are some guaranties of improving the 
supply conditions. Therefore, the expectation is towards finding a negative relationship 
between the variable LEFT and the variable P. 
In the price estimation, we included factors which have a influence on price differences. 
First of all, some binary indicators of what level of use BILL refers to (FIXED,  BILL5,  
BILL20,  BILL50) are considered, to reflect differences in the average price of water 
generated by the nonlinear structure of the tariffs. Next, some of the technical drivers 
were included (QGLOBAL, TREAT2). In principle, we would expect (for a given level of 
raw water quality9) a positive relationship between the global water quality at the 
customers' tap and water prices, since these reflect some of the costs of supplying water 
services. Additionally, we included TREAT2 in order to control for the standard of water 
treatment. 
Regarding socio-economic features, we include ECON to test whether water prices are 
                                                 




higher in richer municipalities, which could be explained by the ability of water suppliers 
to price discriminate as local monopolies or by the progressive character of water prices. 
We are interested in observing if water prices increase or decrease with municipality 
income. Additionally, the variables DENS and ISLAND are considered, since we expect 
higher prices when population density is higher and in the insular provinces because the 
costs of water services are higher too. With respect of climate factors, such as TEMP or  
HUMID , the relationship is not clear, but maybe higher temperatures lead to higher 
consumption levels and water sources of lower quality and/or less quantity, and therefore 
higher costs and prices (Bjornlund, 2003; Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005). 
Finally, a dummy variable representative of the type of management regime (P) is 
included. We want to observe the impact of ownership regime on prices. By isolating the 
effect of private management from the remaining factors, the two-step procedure used, 
allows a proper estimation of this coefficient even when there is a correlation between the 
likelihood of privatization and the error term in the price equation. The expectation is not 
clear, and we would like to test an important issue, which is whether private suppliers set 
higher prices than public ones, everything else the same. 
On the one hand, water prices may be higher after privatizing the service. After all, the 
main goal of the private firm is to maximize profits, so if there were no economic returns, 
it would not be worthwhile to supply water. We mentioned in the introduction the 
oligopolistic structure of the water sector, which could explain a higher probability of 
finding prices above average costs. Additionally, some municipalities privatize water 
services when they have economic or technical difficulties in supplying water. In those 
cases, it is usual that the private operator will raise water prices in order to compensate 
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for the increasing expenditures. On the other hand, if private management is more 
efficient, costs will be lower and prices could decrease. However, regarding efficiency 
issues in water sector, the empirical evidence is not clear at all.10 
Descriptive statistics for the previous variables are shown in Table 2. This shows that our 
sample includes approximately the same number of municipalities with private or mixed 
water management as with a public one. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 about here] 
 
4. Results 
As shown in Table 3, the global tests show the consistency of the econometric procedure 
and results. If we compare a simple Probit estimation with our treatment effects model 
(FIML), we can see that some coefficients increase its significance. In fact, the majority 
of coefficients are significant and according to our expectations. A Wald test of 
independence of the equations (H0: ρ = 0) yields an estimate of χ
2(1) = 6.67 (with Prob > 
χ
2 = 0.0098), suggesting that modelling the effect of privatization without accounting for 
                                                 
10It is possible to find some studies which show that public management is more efficient 
(Mann and Mikesell, 1976; Bruggink, 1982; Lamber et al., 1993; Bhattacharyya et al., 
1994, 1995a), other which defend the higher efficiency levels of private management 
(Morgan, 1977; Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978; Bhattacharyya et al., 1995b; Estache and 
Kouassi, 2002) and finally, several studies which do not find significant differences 
between both kind of management from an efficiency point of view (Feigenbaum and 
Teeples, 1983; Byrnes et al., 1986; Fox and Hofler, 1986; Joner and Mygind, 2000; 
Ménard and Saussier, 2000; Estache and Rossi, 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 2004; García-
Sánchez, 2006). In this respect, an exhaustive review can be seen in Renzetti and Dupont 




the possibility of endogeneity would not be appropriate. The treatment effects model 
(FIML) estimates the correlation between the error terms of the two equations as ρ=-
0.351. Since this is less than zero, the estimated effect of privatization from a single-
equation estimation approach would generally be biased towards zero. That is, ignoring 
the endogeneity of the variable P in the price equation would underestimate the effect of 
privatization on prices. This is confirmed by the non-significance of the coefficient of this 
variable in the more naive models OLS and RE in Table 3. That is, ignoring the 
correlation between the errors in both equations would lead us to wrongly estimate that 
prices under privatized management are not significantly higher than under public 
management. 
Model FIML is a Heckman selection model based on full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) and it assumes joint normality of the errors in both equations (as 
explained in Section 2). If this assumption is valid, the estimates obtained are consistent, 
efficient, and asymptotically normal. An alternative approach that does not rely on the 
assumption of joint normality of the errors would be a two-step Heckman selection 
method.11 This would not assume joint normality; just normality of the error in the 
privatization equation, but would be inefficient if the errors are indeed jointly normal. We 
compared both approaches (leaving out the cluster option) and found no substantial 
differences in the results obtained. However, we chose to finally use the FIML model 
because it showed a slight advantage in terms of efficiency (the size of the coefficients 
would be larger and their t-ratios slightly larger too) and because it would allow us to use 
a cluster option to account for the pseudo-panel of the data set. The results of this 
                                                 
11This would be the treatreg routine with the option twostep in STATA 9.1 (StataCorp, 
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comparison are not reported but available upon request. 
The treatment selection equation shows that the probability of finding private 
management of water services is higher if some technical and productive conditions 
affecting the operational environment are harder. Therefore, we find some supporting 
evidence for the argument that privatization may be more likely in municipalities where 
municipal governments face more difficulties to supply water by itself. For example, we 
observed a positive effect of having at least part of the water resources extracted from 
underground sources (SUNDER). Production costs are expected to be higher when some 
of the water comes from underground sources. However, our results suggest that private 
suppliers carry out less intensive or standard treatments, as the positive coefficients of the 
dummy variables TREAT1 and TREAT1 show.
12 This fact, jointly with the negative sign of  
QGLOBAL, would support the notion that a private or mixed firm supplies water of a 
lower quality. 
Additionally, we found a negative relationship between the probability of there being a 
privatized water supply service and the size of the municipality, in terms of population 
(POP) and area (AREA). In other words, private or mixed management is more frequently 
present in small or medium cities, where it is possible that the economies of scale have 
not been fully exploited and the firm was not supplying the optimum amount of water. 
This adds further support to the idea that private management operates more often under 
not the best productive conditions. The negative sign in the case of population is in line 
                                                                                                                                                 
2005). 
12The baseline type of treatment (omitted dummy) would be TREAT3, associated to a 




with the finds of Miralles (2006), who found a negative relationship between the 
probability of being privatized and the number of inhabitants of the municipality during 
the period 1996-2002. 
The less advantageous costs conditions may be compensated by a higher probability of 
getting higher revenues. The positive sign found for some variables (ECON and 
SECDWEL) is representative of that idea. Private firms apparently prefer to supply water 
services in higher income municipalities, or in those places where there are more 
secondary dwellings in absolute terms, complementing in this way the revenues from 
main dwellings. However, private firms prefer more secure and non-seasonal revenues, as 
the negative coefficient of PSECTOT is showing. Regarding the remaining features of the 
housing stock, there is a higher probability of finding a private or mixed firm supplying 
water in those municipalities with a higher percentage of one-floor main dwellings. 
Additionally, we observe that the coefficient decreases with height in the case of main 
residences, and increases in the case of secondary dwellings. Finally, and as expected, 
left-wing local governments are less prone to privatize water services, as the coefficient 
of LEFT shows. Due to the low level of competition in the water sector, left-wing 
governments are suspicious about whether privatization leads to efficiency gains, so they 
tend to decided against it. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 about here] 
 
 
Regarding the price equation, we obtained some interesting findings. A lower input water 
quality (QGLOBAL) leads to higher costs, so average water prices are higher too. In 
municipalities where only a standard water treatment is applied prices are lower. 
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Additionally, we observe that, somewhat surprisingly, average water prices are negatively 
related to the economic level of the municipality (ECON), suggesting that in a way water 
prices as a fee are regressive. On the other hand, we found a positive relationship between 
water prices and population density (DENS) in the municipality. This can be explained by 
recognizing that when the spatial concentration of population is high production costs can 
be higher (there is more pressure over water resources and system, it is more costly to 
undertake repairs, etc.). 
Desalinization is usually used in some islands, which may explain the higher price levels 
observed in municipalities located in Canarias and Baleares ( ISLAND ). With respect to 
climate variables, only temperature (TEMP) is significant. This variable is strongly 
correlated with the demand, in the sense that higher temperatures lead to higher 
consumption levels. The pressure over water resources increases, so supply costs are 
higher. According to peak-load demand theory, higher prices must be set on periods with 
an intense consumption. 
Finally, we have found a positive and significant coefficient for the  P   variable. That 
means that, ceteris paribus, private or mixed firms set higher average price levels that 
public ones. This fact suggests that private firms, searching to maximize profits, set 
higher prices in order to achieve that objective. We found significant differences in prices 
in the case of private or mixed management which are not exclusively explained by costs 
differences (we control in the price equation for some cost features). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 about here] 
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Table 4 shows the marginal effects of a one-unit change in each variable on the average 
price. We have calculated the changes of the expected value of BILL conditional on  P=1 
(being privatized) in the first column and conditional on  P=0 in the second column. 
Additionally, we show the marginal effects for the probability of being privatized (third 
column). Comparing the first and second columns, we can observe that price differences 
are explained more by `revenue' factors when we condition on being privatized. Some 
marginal effects, such as those related to the economic level or the number of secondary 
dwellings, are higher in the first column, and other more related to costs, such as the 
related to global quality or treatments are lower in absolute terms. 
 
5. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
The debate between private and public management has a long tradition in the economic 
literature. When it comes to the privatization of services such as water supply, subject to 
local monopoly conditions which leave little room for competition, there are opposing 
views surround the debate. One of the main arguments against privatisation is that water 
prices are higher under private management, since the private profit-maximising firms 
exploit their dominant position. However, given the dearth of conclusive empirical 
evidence about this issue, we have investigated whether water prices were indeed higher 
under private management. We show the results of testing, on a dataset comprising the 
main urban centres in Spain, whether private utilities charge higher prices than public 
ones without apparent justification. 
These results have policy implications in countries such as Spain and France, where local 
governments can pass on to private firms the management of water supply services. 
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These implications are the more relevant once we consider that the private sphere of this 
industry is dominated by a few large corporations, that there is usually little competition 
when the public manager calls for bids from he private sector (sometimes only one firm 
bids when the local government decides to relinquish management), and that the 
decisions made at the local level are not supervised by watchdog bodies such as OFWAT 
in England and Wales. On the other hand, in countries where water supply is expected by 
law to remain under public management, the conclusions of analyses like this one could 
help to inform foreseen regulatory changes. 
First we analysed whether factors describing the operational environment had been key to 
the decision of privatising the water supply service. Our results match our hypotheses: 
local governments appear more likely to relinquish the management when they operate 
under more complex environments, while private firms seek to take over the service in 
those areas where it is easier to obtain higher profits. A second phase of the analysis 
shows that, once the factors describing the operational environment have been accounted 
for, it can be seen that private firms set on average higher prices than the public ones. 
This result lends support to the idea that private firms do exploit their dominant position, 
which suggests that the regulatory framework might be somewhat lax. It may be wise for 
local governments to, before privatising the services, have studies conducted by qualified 
specialists to make sure that the water service is managed ensuring maximum customer 
welfare and to make sure that the control of the price review process does not rely 
exclusively on mere administration officials. 
Finally, as a future research, it would be useful to consider whether the regulatory 
constraints are being met. It would be interesting to check, first, whether price setting 
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respects the principle of costs recovery and second, whether the legal framework 
promotes prices leading to an efficient use of the water resources. This is especially 
relevant as the effects of climate change emerge (with higher temperatures and less and 
more irregular precipitation), there is increased demand pressure due to low relative water 
prices, and there are evident environmental and economic limits to the development of 
new infrastructure. Finally, it is noteworthy that water prices are negatively related to the 
income level of the municipality. It would be interesting to analyse whether the 
regulatory framework in Spain is leading to inequitable water prices. 
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VARIABLE TYPE DESCRIPTION (UNITS)  SOURCE 
 )2(FIXED   C =1 if BILL is the fixed quota, =0 otherwise Water supplier 
 )2(5BILL   
D =1 if BILL is the AVP corresponding to 5 m 3  , =0 
otherwise 
Water supplier 
 )2(20BILL   
D =1 if BILL is the AVP corresponding to 20 m 3  , =0 
otherwise 
Water supplier 
 )2(50BILL   
D =1 if BILL is the AVP corresponding to 50 m 3  , =0 
otherwise 
Water supplier 
 )2,1(ECON   S Index of economic level in the municipality La Caixa (2006) 
 )2(TEMPER   C Average annual temperature (ºC) Meteorological National 
Institute 
 )2(HUMID   C Average annual relative humid (%) Meteorological National 
Institute 
 )1(QGLOBAL   S Index of global water quality OCU (2006) 
 )2,1(SUNDER   D =1 if water partly extracted from underground 
sources, =0 otherwise 
SINAC (2006) 
 )1(1TREAT   
D Water treatment 1: filtration and disinfection or less SINAC (2006) 
 )2,1(2TREAT   
D Water treatment 2: normal physical and chemical 
treatment and disinfection 
SINAC (2006) 
 )1(POP   C Population (inhabitants) INE (2005) 
 )1(AREA   C Area (km2) INE (2005) 
 )2(DENS   C Population density (inhabitants/km2) INE (2005) 
 )2(ISLAND   D =1 if it is a municipality located in an island, =0 
otherwise 
Own construction 
 )1(SECDWEL   C Total number of secondary dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(1PM   
C % of 1-floor main dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(3PM   
C % of 3-floor main dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(7PM   
C % 7-floor main dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(1PSEC   
C % 1-floor secondary dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(6PSEC   
C % of 6-floor secondary dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(9PSEC   
C % of 9-floor secondary dwellings INE (2005) 
 )1(PSECTOT   C % of secondary dwellings on total housing INE (2005) 
 )1(LEFT   D =1 if municipal government is left-wing 0= 
otherwise 
INE (2005) 
 )2,1(P   D =1 if water supplier is a private or a mixed-
ownership firm 
Water supplier 





VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
 BILL   408  0.6169811 0.7521102 0.0182815 6.364486 
 FIXED  408 0.125 0.331125 0 1 
 BILL5   408 0.125 0.331125 0 1 
 BILL20   408 0.125 0.331125 0 1 
 BILL50   408 0.125 0.331125 0 1 
 ECON   408 6.156863 2.073562 3 10 
 QGLOBAL  408 2.843137 1.056117 1 4 
 TEMPER  408 15.10784 2.897688 10.5 22.3 
 HUMID  408 0.6564706 0.059476 0.56 0.79 
 DENS   408 0.2505667 0.3214697 0.005086 1.622111 
 ISLAND  408 0.0392157 0.1943461 0 1 
 P   408 0.5098039 0.5005176 0 1 
 AREA   408 0.3183804 0.394621 0.0123 1.75033 
 POP   408 34.54625 62.29078 3.3238 315.5359 
 SUNDER  408 0.1764706 0.3816881 0 1 
 TREAT1   408 0.0392157 0.1943461 0 1 
 TREAT2   408 0.3333333 0.4719833 0 1 
 SECDWEL  408 1.245812 2.110052 0.2161 10.6192 
 PM1   408 0.0561106 0.0498017 0.0048884 0.2391663 
 PM3   408 0.0613748 0.0340216 0.0105117 0.1594924 
 PM7   408 0.096517 0.0351168 0.0227966 0.1781258 
 PSEC1   408 0.0933152 0.0986654 0.0054395 0.3830434 
 PSEC6   408 0.1271567 0.0468151 0.0333463 0.2213394 
 PSEC9   408 0.0235526 0.0196195 0 0.0783293 
 PSECTOT  408 0.1130246 0.0444417 0.0263071 0.2507916 
 LEFT   408 0.3137255 0.4645759 0 1 
Table 2: Summary descriptives of variables 
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 VARIABLE  PROBIT    OLS    GLS    FIML   
BILL equation  FIXED   1.713*** 1.713*** 1.711*** 
  BILL5    -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.073*** 
  BILL20    0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
  BILL50    0.232*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 
  QGLOBAL    -0.045** -0.045** -0.045** 
  TREAT2    -0.098 -0.098* -0.106* 
  ECON    -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
  DENS    0.140* 0.14* 0.157** 
  ISLAND   0.771*** 0.771*** 0.756*** 
  TEMP    0.032*** 0.032*** 0.027** 
  HUMID   0.857* 0.857* 0.598 
  P    0.074 0.074 0.116** 
  cons    -0.366 -0.366 -0.13 
P  equation  QGLOBAL   -0.869*   -0.977** 
  SUNDER  34.414***   34.813*** 
  TREAT1   5.345***   5.453*** 
  TREAT2   12.836***   12.875*** 
  POP   -1.573***   -1.600*** 
  AREA   -2.316*   -2.401* 
  ECON   5.439***   5.526*** 
  SECDWEL   44.929***   45.825*** 
  PM1   339.226***   338.164*** 
  PM3   106.744***   107.931*** 
  PM7   42.986   44,365 
  PSEC1   68.224***   72.322*** 
  PSEC6   75.020**   77.574*** 
  PSEC9   307.073***   307.712*** 
  PSECTOT   -70.950***   -72.071*** 
  LEFT   -8.331***   -8.586*** 
  cons   -85.237***   -86.345*** 
 ath( ρ  )    -0.366*** 
 σln     844*** 
 Wald chi2(12)   1193.40*** 504.05*** 
 N 408 408 408 408 
 R2  0.8216 0.6734 0.6734  
 ll -282.726 -233.913  -281.941 
Legend: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  





ˆ( ==CILLB  636.0)1|ˆ( ==CILLB  PROBIT 
  1)|( =CbillE   0)|( =CbillE  314.0)(rP̂ =Pob  Evaluated at 
X = 
 FIXED* 1.711 1.711  0.125 
 BILL5 * -0.073 -0.073  0.125 
 BILL20 * 0.048 0.048  0.125 
 BILL50 * 0.232 0.232  0.125 
 QGLOBAL   -0.152 -0.152  2.843 
 TREAT2 * 0.644 0.644  0.333 
 ECON   0.567 0.567  6.157 
 DENS   0.157 0.157  0.251 
 ISLAND* 0.756 0.756  0.039 
 TEMP   0.027 0.027  15.108 
 HUMID  0.598 0.598  0.656 
 P * 0.000 0.000  0.510 
 SUNDER* 1.022 4.257 0.758 0.176 
 TREAT1 * 0.195 0.684 -0.567 0.039 
 POP   -0.176 -0.125 -0.851 34.546 
 AREA   -0.264 -0.188 16.249 0.318 
 SECDWEL   5.041 3.579 119.907 1.246 
 PM1   37.199 26.413 38.270 0.056 
 PM3   11.873 8.430 15.731 0.061 
 PM7   4.880 3.465 25.644 0.097 
 PSEC1   7.956 5.649 27.507 0.093 
 PSEC6   8.534 6.059 109.109 0.127 
 PSEC9   33.850 24.035 -25.555 0.024 
 PSECTOT   -7.928 -5.629 -0.986 0.113 
 LEFT* -0.979 -0.386  0.314 
For variables marked with *, the marginal effect correspond to the change of those binary variables from 
zero to one 
Table 4: Marginal effects  
 
 
